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MEAD AS (MOSTLY) MOOT: PREDICTIVE
INTERPRETATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Ryan D. Doerfler †

In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services, the Supreme Court explained that, within the domain of unclear
agency-administered statutes, a federal court is subordinate to an
administering agency. When an administering agency speaks
authoritatively, federal court practice reflects this. When an agency speaks
only informally, however, federal court practice does not. Specifically, when
construing an agency-administered statute absent an authoritative agency
interpretation, a federal court errs, given its subordinate status, when it
exercises independent judgment concerning what interpretation is best.
Instead, that subordinate status requires a court to predict what
authoritative interpretation the administering agency would adopt—just as
a federal court would predict how a state’s highest court would answer
some unsettled question of state law. Adhering to this predictive approach
requires in turn that a court assign significant—in most cases dispositive—
evidentiary weight to agency interpretations contained within certain
legally nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs. This is because
the non-authoritative interpretations contained in such instruments will
most often constitute the best available evidence concerning what an
administering agency would say if it were to speak authoritatively. This
conclusion is surprising given the central holding of United States v. Mead
Corp. that interpretations contained in nonbinding instruments are not
entitled to controlling deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. What this article will suggest is that the
central holding of Mead ought to be mostly moot since, even where
controlling deference is not owed de jure, it is most often owed de facto.

† Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law
School. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Daniel Abebe, Jake Gersen, John
Manning, Jonathan Masur, Philip Mayor, Matthew Stephenson, and Henry Weissmann.
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INTRODUCTION
When making sense of unclear administrative statutes, courts
operate as subordinates. While “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” 1 the tasks of
enacting and executing it are, as a rule, left to the other branches. 2 And,
beginning with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 3 courts have come to regard the task of construing an
unclear 4 term or provision within an agency-administered statute less as
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962) (“[T]he
policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the
distinguishing characteristic of the [democratic] system.”); Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice,
The Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (Mar. 18, 1947),
available
at
http://mtweb.mtsu.edu/cewillis/Hermeneutics/Frankfurter%20Reading%20
Statutes.pdf (“In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come from those
popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not.”).
3 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4 While both courts and commentators typically treat “ambiguity” as a blanket term for
textual unclarity, strictly speaking, “ambiguity” constitutes only a subset of unclarity. A text is
“ambiguous” only insofar as it admits of more than one distinct meaning (e.g., a text in which the
term “bank” might refer to a riverbank or a financial bank). By contrast, a text is also unclear if it
is “vague,” i.e., insofar as its precise extension is uncertain (e.g., a text in which it is unclear
whether the extension of the phrase “the elderly” includes individuals who are sixty-two years
old). See, e.g., Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
1
2
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one of “say[ing] what the law is” 5 than as some mixture of declaring
what the law shall be and carrying it into effect. 6 Understanding that
mixed task as one principally assigned to the relevant administering
agency, 7 courts have, in turn, taken up the now familiar practice of
deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation where unclarity exists
within a statute that an agency administers. 8 Because agencies, not
courts, have “primary interpretive authority” within that domain, 9 that
courts afford Chevron deference to agency interpretations is, according
to this picture, simply a reflection of those courts’ subordinate status. 10
While the way that courts behave when agencies speak—
authoritatively, at least—respects the hierarchical relationship between
them, what this Article will suggest is that the way that courts behave
when agencies have yet to speak does not. More specifically, what this
Article will argue is that, when acting in the absence of an authoritative
agency interpretation, courts err, in light of their status as interpretive
subordinates, in exercising independent judgment as to what
interpretation they think would be best. Instead, that subordinate status
compels courts to predict what authoritative interpretation the relevant
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 128–29 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, eds.,
2012). As a doctrinal matter, Chevron commands deference in cases of vagueness and ambiguity
alike. See 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). As a matter of principle, however, one could
at least argue that a claim of implicit delegation is far more plausible with respect to instances of
vagueness (e.g., whether “bank” refers to a credit union) than with respect to instances of
ambiguity (e.g., whether “bank” refers to a riverbank or a financial bank).
5 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
6 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617–18 (1996) (“Chevron is grounded in the modern
constitutional principle that Congress can delegate significant ‘legislative’ policymaking discretion
to agencies . . . .”); see also A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 168 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“Once that gap was created, the agency was left with an open policy space, which was the
quintessence of legislative-type action to which Chevron deference was due.” (citation omitted)).
7 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.” (footnote omitted)).
8 See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”(footnote omitted)).
9 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1273 (2002).
10 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005) (“Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an
agency is charged with administering is not authoritative . . . .”); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

DOERFLER.36.2.2

502

12/18/2014 2:47 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:499

agency would put forward. Adhering to this predictive approach
requires in turn that courts assign significant—in most cases
dispositive—evidentiary weight to agency interpretations contained
within certain legally nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs
and, at least potentially, certain non-legislative rules. Because the nonauthoritative interpretations contained in such instruments most often
constitute the best available evidence concerning what an agency would
do if it were to speak authoritatively, courts will rarely have epistemic
justification to predict a change in interpretive course. This conclusion
is surprising in part because of the way it interacts with the central
holding of United States v. Mead Corp. 11 that the interpretations
contained in such instruments are not to receive deference under
Chevron. 12 What this Article will suggest is that the central holding of
Mead ought to be regarded as mostly moot since, even where deference
is not owed de jure, it is more often than not owed de facto.
In arguing for the near mootness of Mead, this Article will draw
upon the symmetry between the role of federal courts with respect to
questions of administrative and state law, respectively. 13 As the Supreme
Court observed in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services, 14 federal courts occupy a subordinate role in the
administrative and the state law context alike. 15 In the state law context,
where highest state courts retain primary interpretive authority, federal
courts adhere to a set of practices calibrated to ensure maximum fidelity
to those highest state courts, subject to fairness and resource constraints.
First and most straightforward, where the relevant state’s highest court
has spoken authoritatively on some question of state law, federal courts
will act in accordance with that state court’s ruling, regardless of any
prior, conflicting rulings either on the part of that state court or any
federal court. 16 Second, where the relevant state’s highest court has yet
to speak on some unsettled question of state law, federal courts will,
where practicable, provide that state court the opportunity to do so. 17
While in the past state courts relied upon various abstention doctrines
to provide this opportunity, more recently, certification—along with its
533 U.S. 218, 229–33 (2001).
See id.; accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.”).
13 Within legal scholarship, this symmetry has been explored most thoroughly by Kenneth
Bamberger and Kathryn Watts. See Bamberger, supra note 9; Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to
Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007).
14 545 U.S. 967.
15 See id. at 983–84 (drawing analogy between federal courts’ respective role in the two
contexts).
16 See infra Part I.A.
17 See infra Part II.A.1.
11
12
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perceived lower attendant costs—has come to be the preferred device.18
Third and final, where impracticable to provide that opportunity to
speak, rather than exercising independent judgment, federal courts
confronted with an unsettled question of state law will limit themselves
to predicting how the relevant state’s highest court would rule. 19
As this Article will discuss, federal court practice in the
administrative law context largely mirrors that in the state law context—
with one significant exception. As in the state law context, federal courts
will defer to the primary interpreter—here, administering agencies—
when that interpreter speaks authoritatively on an interpretive
question. 20 Likewise, as in the state law context, federal courts will,
through adherence to the rule on remand and application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, provide the relevant interpretive
authority the opportunity to speak on a question of interpretation that it
has yet to address where it would be practicable to do so. 21 Where
administrative and state law practice diverge, however, and where, this
Article will argue, federal courts deviate from their role as subordinate,
is in circumstances where providing that opportunity to speak is
impracticable. As mentioned above, rather than limiting themselves to
prediction, courts in such circumstances exercise independent judgment
in answering the interpretive questions before them. 22 In so doing,
courts substitute what they deem good policymaking for fidelity to rule,
bringing about in turn the various costs that result from having
competing rather than cooperative interpretive bodies. These adverse
consequences are all the greater as a result of a significant asymmetry
between the administrative and the state law context, with the
asymmetry being that, unlike in the state law context, where evidence is
often sparse concerning how a given state court would proceed, in the
administrative law context, evidence of what a given administering
agency would do is readily available in the form of interpretations
contained in nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs. 23 As a
result, whereas the difference between prediction and the exercise of
independent judgment is plausibly insubstantial in a number of state
law cases, the difference between the two in administrative law contexts
is inarguably significant. Ironically, then, although the administrative
law context is the one in which it is possible to predict with significant
accuracy, it is the context in which federal courts abandon the approach.

18
19
20
21
22
23

See id.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.
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This Article will consist of two parts. In Part I, it will articulate
the rationales for regarding federal courts as subordinates within the
state and the administrative law context, respectively. In so doing, it will
discuss the, at this point, uncontroversial practice whereby federal
courts defer to the official determinations of state courts and agencies
within their respective domains of authority. In Part II, it will discuss
the ways in which subordinate federal courts behave in the absence of
such authoritative pronouncements. First it will outline the parallels
between the various abstention doctrines and certification in the state
law context and remand and primary jurisdiction in the administrative
law context as methods to provide the relevant authority the
opportunity to speak authoritatively on a particular matter when it has
yet to do so. Second, it will discuss the asymmetry between the behavior
of federal courts in the administrative and the state law contexts when
providing that opportunity to speak would be impracticable, observing
that whereas federal courts limit themselves to predicting how the
relevant authority would rule in the state law context, said courts permit
themselves to exercise independent judgment in the administrative law
context, thereby engaging in insubordination.
I. PRIMARY INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY AND PROVISIONAL PRECEDENT
As the Supreme Court observed in Brand X, federal courts operate
as subordinates in the state and the administrative law contexts alike. In
that case, the Court was presented with the question of whether federal
courts owe deference to an interpretation of an unclear regulatory
statute by an administering agency even where prior, conflicting judicial
interpretations exist. Over a vociferous dissent from Justice Scalia, who
deemed both “bizarre” and “probably unconstitutional” the prospect of
agencies “revers[ing] or ignor[ing]” judicial determinations not to their
liking, 24 the Court ruled that deference was owed even in these
circumstances. 25 In response to Justice Scalia’s objections, the Court
observed that, just as there is nothing “bizarre” about the prospect of a
ruling by a state’s highest court taking precedence over an earlier,
conflicting federal court determination in a matter of state law, neither
should there be anything unsettling about the prospect of an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers—at least where unclear—
supplanting an earlier judicial one. 26 As the Court observed, because in
both contexts the primary interpretive authority rests not with the
24 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 985.
26 Id. at 983–84.
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federal judiciary but, instead, with some other decision-maker,
determinations by the federal judiciary in either context are correctly
understood as provisional, with the state court or agency, respectively,
retaining the authority to shape the law in the way that it sees fit. 27
That federal courts operate as subordinates in both the state and
the administrative law context is thought to follow from a core
constitutional value in each case. In the context of state law, the
constitutional value in question is federalism. 28 In the administrative law
context, it is the separation of powers. 29 Whatever the constitutional
basis, insofar as one concedes that federal courts operate as subordinates
in each context, one is committed straightaway to the conclusion that
any determinations issued by those courts are provisional, to be
supplanted if and when the relevant decision-maker speaks in its
authoritative capacity. 30
A.

State Courts

That state courts retain primary interpretive authority with respect
to questions of state law is a familiar principle, one that, in the words of
Justice Ginsburg, “reflects the core of federalism.” 31 While a federal
court may be routinely asked to apply state law in order to resolve cases
properly before it on the basis of, for example, diversity jurisdiction,
such a court is to refrain from declaring state law out of respect for our
27 Id.; accord Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1310–15 (outlining theory of “provisional
precedent” for administrative law context modeled federal court handling of unsettled questions
of state law).
28 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (“Federal courts abstain
out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with
principles of comity and federalism.” (citations omitted)); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (characterizing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
“as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch
the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems”).
29 See, e.g., Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Issue Regulations Indexing
Capital Gains for Inflation, 16 Op. O.L.C. 136, 139 n.5 (1992) (“Chevron . . . sounds in the
separation of powers under the Constitution and thus is an important limitation on judicial
power.” (citation omitted)); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (3d ed.
2000) (remarking that Chevron deference is “premised on important separation-of-powers
principles”).
30 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 778 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that, since “the Colorado Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the
meaning of Colorado law,” Supreme Court’s state law determination is necessarily “provisional”);
Watts, supra note 13, at 1015 (“[B]y delegating interpretive authority to an agency, Congress
intends the agency to act as the ‘authoritative interpreter’ of ambiguity in the statute. If an agency
fails to exercise its congressionally-delegated interpretive powers, the courts remain free to
impose their own interpretation in the interim. But if the agency later elects to exercise its
congressionally-delegated powers to select a contrary construction, Chevron commands that the
courts apply the agency’s construction, so long as it is reasonable.” (footnote omitted)).
31 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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system of dual sovereignty. 32 Put simply, as to questions of state law,
state courts are “the only tribunal[s] empowered to speak definitively.”33
As this Article will discuss below, the task of applying while refraining
from declaring state law becomes somewhat complicated when a federal
court is presented with a question of state law to which existing state
court precedent provides no clear answer. 34 However, when state courts
have spoken clearly, the duty of federal courts is straightforward: federal
courts must, barring exceptional circumstances, defer to the state court
interpretation. 35 This remains true even where conflicting federal
precedent exists with respect to the state law question at issue. 36 Federal
courts must regard any prior, conflicting federal precedent as having
been merely “provisional” in character. 37 To do otherwise would, after
all, be to “declare” state law, 38 thereby usurping the state court’s
legitimate interpretive authority, upsetting in turn our system of
“cooperative judicial federalism.” 39
B.

Agencies

That agencies retain primary interpretive authority with respect to
unclear terms or provisions within the statutes that they administer is, at
this point, a familiar principle as well. 40 In Chevron, the Supreme Court
first held that courts are to defer to an agency interpretation of such a
term or provision, subject to the condition that an agency’s
32 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1997) (“Erie’s dual command—that federal
courts apply but not declare state law . . . .” (emphases added)).
33 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959).
34 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 35–40 and
accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2010) (“To properly discern
the content of state law, [the Court of Appeals] ‘must defer to the most recent decisions of the
state’s highest court.’” (quoting Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.
2003))); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curium) (observing that a federal
court “must defer to the state court’s interpretation of state law” (citation omitted)).
36 See, e.g., Wankier, 353 F.3d at 866 (“[W]hen a panel of this Court has rendered a decision
interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on
subsequent panels of this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state’s highest court has
resolved the issue.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266,
1273–74 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The very nature of diversity jurisdiction leaves open the possibility that a
state court will subsequently disagree with a federal court’s interpretation of state law.”).
37 Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1308 (“[O]nce a state exercises its primary authority to make
such a decision or amendment, the federal interpretation is no longer binding. Its precedential
value is, literally, provisional.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
38 Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
39 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391(1974).
40 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (characterizing Chevron as “the most
cited case in modern public law”).
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interpretation falls within the bounds of reasonability. 41 As the Court
reasoned, “if the [agency administered] statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to [a] specific issue,” 42 that silence or ambiguity is best
interpreted as an “implicit” 43 delegation by Congress to the relevant
agency to “fill any gap” created thereby. 44 Thus, if confronted with an
ambiguous provision within an agency-administered statute, “a court
may not substitute its own [interpretation] of [the] statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.” 45
At least on its face, this imputation to Congress of a blanket intent
to delegate might seem plainly incompatible with the Congress’s explicit
instruction that courts “decide all relevant questions of law, [and]
interpret . . . statutory provisions” 46 when confronted with an agencyadministered statute. 47 More fundamentally, one might think that
adopting a general practice of deferring to agency interpretation of
ambiguous statutory terms constitutes a dramatic abdication by the
judiciary of its basic “duty,” assigning to agencies the paradigmatically
judicial task of stating the law. 48 However, as Justice Scalia has observed,
one need see no abdication here:
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can
be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress
intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2)
Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave
its resolution to the agency. When the former is the case, what we
have is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved by the
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
Id. at 843.
43 Id. at 844.
44 Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
45 Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
46 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that the language of § 706 “would seem to mean that all statutory ambiguities are to be
resolved judicially” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2637, 2640 (2003) (“Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act is a broad
statement delegating that authority to courts, contrary to the rule adopted in Chevron.” (footnotes
omitted)).
48 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074–
75 (1990) (characterizing Chevron as a “counter-Marbury, for the administrative state”); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 436
(1995) (“Always, there has been strong authority for what we could call the Marbury view of
administrative law . . . . Under this view, no deference in interpretation is called for: Interpretation
is just lawfinding, and courts rather than bureaucrats are given the power to find federal law.”);
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986)
(“[T]he executive branch . . . is displacing the judiciary in its traditional and jealously guarded
law-declaring function.” (footnote omitted)).
41
42

DOERFLER.36.2.2

508

12/18/2014 2:47 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:499

courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of
discretion upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to
the courts is whether the agency has acted within the scope of its
discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is
reasonable. 49

According to Justice Scalia, then, insofar as unclarity within an
agency-administered statute is best understood as a “conferral of
discretion upon the agency,” 50 the resolution of such unclarity is not, as
in the ordinary case, an act of interpretation, i.e., one of attempting to
discern the meaning of the term or provision that Congress intended,
but, rather, an act of policy making, i.e., one of deciding what the
meaning of the unclear term or provision shall be. 51 Unconstrained by
the norm of interpretive fidelity 52—again, there is, by stipulation, no
congressionally intended meaning to which an agency could be
faithful 53—the “interpreting” agency is thus free, subject to the
constraint of textual fit, to adopt whatever interpretation it believes, in
light of present knowledge and circumstances, 54 will best advance its
49 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 516 (emphases added).
50 Id.
51 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
5 (2001) (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as
Congress’s faithful agents.” (footnote omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent
conception of the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the
legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably
the legislature.” (footnote omitted)).
53 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (holding
deference appropriate because “Congress did not have a specific intention” as to the meaning of
the relevant term); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1024 (“After Chevron, it no
longer makes sense to speak . . . of a statute administered by an agency as having a single ‘most
natural or logical’ meaning.”).
54 With an emphasis placed upon “present.” See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency. An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis, for example,
in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations . . . .” (first alteration
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–
64)); Scalia, supra note 49, at 517 (“[T]here is no longer any justification for giving ‘special’
deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency interpretations of law. That venerable
principle made a lot of sense when we assumed that both court and agency were searching for the
one, permanent, ‘correct’ meaning of the statute; it makes no sense when we acknowledge that the
agency is free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive
to accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”). The Court’s remarks in Brand X notwithstanding,
it remains at least somewhat controversial whether a mere “change in administration” constitutes
a sufficient basis for a change in an agency’s interpretation. Compare, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their
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overall policy agenda. 55 As a result, when a court defers to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an unclear statutory term or provision, far
from abdicating its duty to “say what the law is,” 56 that court is, in
compliance with Congress’s intent, 57 appropriately ceding to the
technically expert and politically accountable agency 58 the mixed,
decidedly non-judicial task of declaring what the law shall be and
determining how best to carry that law into effect. The only task left to
the judiciary, then, is that of determining the “scope of [the agency’s]
discretion,” 59 i.e., the bounds of the “policy space” 60 within which an
agency may exercise its judgment. 61
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits
of its programs and regulations.”), with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 552
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where does, and why would, the APA grant agencies the freedom
to change major policies on the basis of nothing more than political considerations . . . ?”). The
extent to which the Court’s 2009 decision Fox settles the matter remains uncertain. E.g., Fox
Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (“[An agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction
that the reasons for [a] new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency
believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.”). See Randy J.
Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 129 (2011) (“A
majority in Fox refused to subject an administrative reversal to heightened scrutiny, but a
different coalition of five Justices indicated that at least some agency reversals require more
rigorous review.”).
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and
Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (“[S]tandard principles of administrative law so as to permit the
executive to interpret ambiguous provisions as he sees fit, so long as his interpretation is
reasonable.”).
56 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
57 See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 17,
21 (1985) (“Sometimes the most faithful reading of a statute is that the legislature intended to
make no decision on a particular substantive issue and to leave that issue to administrative
creativity. In such a situation, a court’s refusal to use independent judgment actually fulfills
Congress’ intent.” (footnote omitted)).
58 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (contrasting judges, who “are not experts in the field, and are
not part of either political branch of the Government,” with agencies, who possess “great
expertise” and are part of the politically accountable Executive Branch). As Randolph May argues,
the political accountability rationale of Chevron plausibly applies with less force to independent
agencies than to ordinary executive agencies. See Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down:
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 448 (2006) (“[F]or
independent agencies, the political accountability link to the President emphasized in Chevron is
absent.”). But see Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 523 (plurality) (“The independent agencies
are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their
freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased
subservience to congressional direction.” (citations omitted)). Whatever the force of Mr. May’s
argument, it is surely the case that even independent agencies are held to a greater degree of
political accountability than is a federal judiciary with salary protection and life tenure. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
59 Scalia, supra note 49, at 516.
60 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005) (“PostChevron, statutes no longer possess a single prescriptive meaning on many questions; rather, they
describe what I call a ‘policy space,’ a range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a
variety of decisions that the agency might make would be legally defensible to varying degrees.”);
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Whether operating within a policy space is best understood as a
legislative activity, an executive activity, or some combination of the
two, 62 what is relevant for present purposes is that, according to the
rationale of Chevron, the resolution of unclarity within agencyadministered statutes—as opposed to statutes more generally 63—is best
understood as something other than the quintessentially judicial activity
of “say[ing] what the law is.” 64 As a result, rather than a shirking of its
judicial duty, the adoption of the practice of deferring to agency
interpretation in this context can thus be characterized as a good faith
attempt by the Court to comply with the negative implication of the
famed Marbury pronouncement, namely that courts do best to refrain
see also, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L.
REV. 597, 601 (2009) (arguing that a court’s role is merely to determine a “statute’s “zone of
ambiguity,” the set of interpretations which the statute does not clearly prohibit”); Peter L.
Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (arguing that a court’s role is merely to determine a
statute’s “‘Chevron space,’” i.e., “the area within which an administrative agency has been
statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its
delegated or allocated authority”).
61 See, e.g., Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 601 (“If [an] agency promulgates an
interpretation within [the identified] zone . . . then under Chevron the reviewing court must
uphold the agency’s interpretation, even though it differs from the court’s most-preferred
construction . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 60, at 1145 (“Faced with the exercise of such authority, the
natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is to see that the ball stays within the
bounds of the playing field and that the game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts
themselves to play the game. From a finding of law that Congress has validly allocated authority
to a noncourt body, it follows ineluctably that that other body has the authority to decide the
issues allocated to it, subject to such judicial supervision as oversight entails.”).
62 Compare, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (characterizing an agency’s “adoption of a [legislative] rule [a]s an exercise of the
executive rather than the legislative power”), with Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
628 (1935) (referring to agency activity as “quasi legislative” in character).
63 While some argue that “Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that
resolution of statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle,” Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580,
2610 (2006); see also Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook,
J.) (characterizing Chevron as “in effect equating statutory interpretation to policymaking”
(citation omitted)), courts continue to regard fidelity the governing norm when interpreting the
ordinary statute. See infra notes 64, 154 and accompanying text.
64 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In other words, something other
than discerning the “best,” in the sense of the most faithful, interpretation of a given legal text. See
generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (discussing the
norm of interpretive fidelity generally). The contrast is, in this context, most often brought to the
fore in discussions of the (ir)relevance of consistency of an agency’s interpretation to the question
of whether that interpretation warrants deference. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not believe, to begin with, that particular deference is owed to
an agency interpretation of longstanding duration. That notion is an anachronism—a relic of the
pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to be only one ‘correct’ interpretation of a statutory
text. A ‘longstanding’ agency interpretation, particularly one that dated back to the very origins of
the statute, was more likely to reflect the single correct meaning. But once it is accepted, as it was
in Chevron, that there is a range of permissible interpretations, and that the agency is free to move
from one to another, so long as the most recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity should
make no difference.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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from engaging non-judicial activities where possible, 65 in particular
where Congress has specifically intended—albeit implicitly and, indeed,
fictionally 66—that courts leave such activities to another decisionmaker. 67
Once one understands the interpretation of an unclear term or
provision within an agency-administered statute as a policymaking task,
a policymaking task delegated by Congress not to the judiciary but to
the administering agency, the Court’s holding in Brand X that a federal
court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of some such
term or provision notwithstanding any prior, conflicting judicial
interpretation becomes straightforward enough. Just as a federal court
lacks the authority to declare state law, so too does it lack the authority
to declare federal law where Congress has specifically assigned that
authority to another decision-maker. Under these circumstances, a
court’s insistence that its own prior, conflicting decision ought to take
precedent over a later decision by the congressionally designated
decision-maker would fly in the face of the separation of powers twiceover, conflicting first with the general presumption that courts are to
refrain from acts of policymaking where possible and second with
Congress’s authority to allocate decision-making authority where it sees
fit.

65 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(“The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches.’” (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)));
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—the Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821,
822 (1990) (“[U]ndeniably whether one is examining the Constitution or legislation, with respect
to a given case, one often encounters ambiguities. Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition
that a political branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the
judiciary.” (footnote omitted)); Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of
Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2045 (2010) (“Chevron deference is best understood as
maintaining the traditional constitutional balance in which policy discretion is kept out of the
hands of the politically unaccountable judiciary . . . .”); cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 380 (6th ed. 2012) (recognizing “strong presumption against the federal
courts fashioning common law to decide cases”).
66 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 370 (1986) (recognizing fictional nature of Chevron’s presumption concerning congressional
intent); Scalia, supra note 49, at 517 (same).
67 See Manning, supra note 6, at 626–27 (“Chevron adopts a background presumption
[concerning congressional intent] that reconciles now firmly established conceptions of
delegation with constitutional structure. It is more consistent with the assumptions of our
constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert, representative, and accountable
administrative agencies.”).
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II. ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION
As mentioned above, federal courts have long recognized in the
state law context that, where a court occupies a subordinate role in an
interpretive hierarchy, its subordinate status ought to shape not only the
way that court behaves when its interpretive authority has acted, but
also when that authority has yet to do so. When presented with a
question of state law to which existing state court precedent provides no
clear answer, a federal court will behave in recognition of its subordinate
status in one of two ways: First, where practicable, a federal court will
attempt, either through abstention 68 or certification, 69 to provide the
relevant state court with the opportunity to speak directly and
authoritatively on the state law question at issue. Second, where
abstention or certification is impracticable, a federal court will attempt
to minimize the likelihood of a conflict with a later, authoritative state
court ruling by limiting itself to predicting how the relevant state court
would decide the matter. 70 By adhering to this dual approach of
abstention/certification and prediction, a federal court not only fosters
comity with the authoritative state court by deferring to that court’s
judgment where practicable, but also increases fairness to individual
litigants by minimizing the likelihood of inconsistent applications of
state law across cases.
By contrast, federal courts have taken their subordinate status into
account only partially when presented with a question of interpretation
concerning an ambiguous term or provision within an agencyadministered statute absent an authoritative interpretation by the
administering agency. Federal courts have, in this context, substantially
replicated the state law practice of abstention by adhering to the rule on
remand by which a court will remand to an agency adjudicatory body in
order to provide it the opportunity to address authoritatively an open
interpretive question, 71 and to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
68 See, e.g., Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
abstention required in case involving disputed questions of state gaming law); Catlin v. Ambach,
820 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding abstention required in case involving interpretation of
state education law).
69 See, e.g., Nunez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2012) (certifying
to Florida Supreme Court question concerning interpretation of Florida insurance statute);
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 607 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010) (certifying to California
Supreme Court question of California constitutional law).
70 See, e.g., Jaworowski v. Ciasulli, 490 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007) (predicting how New
Jersey Supreme Court would interpret New Jersey statute of limitations for personal injury
actions); DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 111–15 (2d Cir. 2005) (predicting how New York
Court of Appeals would interpret New York libel law).
71 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (holding that remand to Board of
Immigration appropriate, barring exceptional circumstances, where the Board “has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question”).
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pursuant to which a federal court may dismiss or stay a case in order to
provide the relevant agency to consider directly the case before the court
or a specific issue contained therein. 72 At the same time, federal courts—
in combination with Congress and the various regulatory agencies—
have failed to replicate in the administrative law context the more
efficient state law practice of certification, thereby providing agencies
less of an opportunity (at least in this one respect) to speak directly and
authoritatively to unanswered interpretive questions within their
purview than is provided to their state court counterparts. Much more
problematically, federal courts have failed (almost) entirely to replicate
in the administrative law context the state law practice of limiting
themselves to predicting how the relevant agency would answer a given
interpretive question when there is no opportunity to allow the agency
to speak directly and authoritatively to the matter. Instead, federal
courts have preferred to exercise their own judgment when answering
such questions, taking into account (readily available) signals
concerning the relevant agency’s preferred interpretation only where the
court deems the content of those signals to be persuasive, 73 i.e., as
indicating to the court that the agency’s preferred interpretation is the
“correct” one. 74 While federal courts have plausibly adhered to the
independent judgment approach in an effort to give effect to the
Supreme Court’s instruction in Mead not to accord full Chevron
deference to agency interpretation contained within instruments lacking
“the force of law,” 75 the end result has been not only the aggrandizement
of federal courts at the expense of their interpretive superiors, but also
the bringing about of unfairness to individual litigants as a result of an

72 See, e.g., In re StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Instead of
trying to divine how the FCC would resolve the ambiguity created by the word “location,” we
think it best to send this matter to the Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.”);
Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to
Register of Copyright’s challenge to validity of copyright registration pursuant to doctrine of
primary jurisdiction).
73 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944)).
74 Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“Although not binding on this court, the Secretary’s interpretation of his own regulation is
entitled to some deference, and here we believe that interpretation to be correct.” (emphasis
added)); see also Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA., 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reasoning
that, where Chevron framework inapplicable, “better” interpretation prevails); Kristin E. Hickman
& Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235,
1256 (2007) (acknowledging that “most of the Court’s post-Mead applications of Skidmore review
reflect the independent judgment model”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency
Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005) (“[Mead] basically instructs
courts to exercise independent judgment regarding statutory meaning subject to the weak
requirement that they carefully consider agency views for persuasiveness [where Chevron does not
apply].” (footnote omitted)).
75 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221; accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000).
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increase in the likelihood of inconsistent application of regulatory
statutes across cases.
A.

Abstention/Certification and Remand/Primary Jurisdiction

One obvious way of avoiding conflict with one’s interpretive
superior is for one to provide that superior the opportunity to address
directly as many questions as possible. In the state law context, federal
courts have historically adhered to a number of related abstention
doctrines, pursuant to which such a court will, under certain
circumstances, dismiss or stay a case involving an unsettled question of
state law in order to compel the plaintiff in the case to bring a separate
suit in the relevant state court, thereby presenting that court with the
opportunity to address the unsettled question of state law directly.
Because of the attendant costs of requiring a plaintiff to bring an entirely
separate suit, federal courts have, in recent years, come to rely
increasingly on certification, a process by which a federal court will
request of the relevant state’s highest court that it address, through a
more focused proceeding, the specific unsettled question of state law
that the federal court finds itself confronted with.
In the administrative law context, federal courts largely mirror the
state law practice of abstention through adherence to the rule on
remand and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. On the other hand,
federal courts, in conjunction with both regulatory agencies and
Congress, have thus far failed to adopt a regulatory analogue of
certification. Because certification would be no more efficient than
abstention in soliciting an agency interpretation through notice-andcomment rulemaking, the practical significance of the absence of
regulatory certification is minimal. At the same time, because
certification would provide an efficiency advantage over soliciting an
agency interpretation through formal adjudication, courts, in
conjunction with agencies or Congress, would do best to provide for
and to adopt such a practice.
1.

Abstention/Certification

When confronted with an unsettled interpretive question, perhaps
the surest way for a subordinate federal court to avoid an eventual
conflict with the relevant interpretive authority is to provide that
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authority with an opportunity to speak first on the matter. 76 In the state
law context, a federal court confronted with an unsettled question of
state law will, under the appropriate circumstances, provide the relevant
state court with the opportunity to address that question in one of two
ways. First, a federal court might abstain from deciding the case before
it, 77 requiring that the plaintiff in the case to bring a separate suit in the
relevant state court, thereby providing that state court with the
opportunity to answer any state law questions arising in the case. 78
Second, a federal court might certify the specific state law question it
regards as unsettled to the relevant state’s highest court, 79 thereby
providing that court with the opportunity to rule specifically on that
question before proceeding, if necessary, with the remainder of the case.
Both abstention and certification reflect a commitment by the
federal judiciary to a system of “cooperative judicial federalism.” 80 More
specifically, what those practices reflect is the commitment by that
judiciary to the position that, as to questions of state law, state courts are
the only decision-makers “equipped to rule authoritatively.” 81 Given
that commitment, federal courts regard any rulings where they might
issue concerning unsettled questions of state law that later come into
conflict with authoritative state court rulings as having been made in
“error,” error that can be avoided through abstention or certification. 82
More significantly, recognizing that later conflicting state court rulings
will, in light of their authoritative status, bind future litigants, federal
courts rely on abstention and, more recently, certification as means of
76 See World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir.
2009) (“The only way we can be sure that the state law questions that underlie those three issues
are answered correctly is to certify them to the [state’s highest court].” (citation omitted)).
77 Whether a stay by the federal court or a dismissal (with or without prejudice) is appropriate
will depend upon the abstention doctrine being invoked. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, § 12.3,
at 836 (contrasting so-called Pullman abstention (federal constitutional avoidance), which
normally requires the federal court to stay its proceedings pending the determination of the state
court proceeding, with so-called Burford abstention (interference with complex state regulatory
regime), which requires dismissal with prejudice).
78 Assuming it retained jurisdiction, the federal court would, at that point, take up any
remaining federal questions. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964) (holding claimant, following state court ruling, entitled to return to federal district court
for adjudication of any remaining federal questions).
79 At present forty-five states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have
adopted certification procedures. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4248, n.30 (3d ed. 2004).
80 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
81 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1997); see also, e.g., La. Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (observing that Louisiana state court as
“the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively” on unsettled question of Louisiana state law);
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–500 (1941) (observing that federal court’s
answer to an unsettled question of Texas state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather than a
determination” because “[t]he last word on the meaning of [that law] . . . belongs neither to [the
U.S. Supreme Court] nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas”).
82 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79.
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ensuring consistent treatment—and in turn fairness—for individual
litigants. 83
Because of the attendant costs to litigants, both in terms of time
and money, the Supreme Court has been reasonably hesitant to
recommend that federal courts resort to abstention as a way of
minimizing conflict with their state court superiors. 84 This hesitancy has
plausibly been enhanced by the concern that a federal court runs afoul
of the separation of powers when it refuses to hear a case properly
before it pursuant to a congressional grant of jurisdiction. 85 As a result,
current Supreme Court doctrine calls for abstention only in
“exceptional circumstances” 86 where certain interests in addition to
cooperative judicial federalism would be advanced. 87 And even then, the
Court instructs that abstention is appropriate only where the attendant
costs to litigants would not be undue. 88
83 See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30 (“The consequence of [permitting a federal court to
interpret a previously uninterpreted Louisiana statute] would be that this case would be the only
case in which the Louisiana statute is construed as we would construe it, whereas the rights of all
other litigants would be thereafter governed by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
quite different from ours.”); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (“In this situation a federal court of equity is
asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a
state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court
is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.” (citations omitted)).
84 See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76 (“Attractive in theory because it placed
state-law questions in courts equipped to rule authoritatively on them, Pullman abstention proved
protracted and expensive in practice . . . .”).
85 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to
decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution.”); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984) (arguing that various
abstention doctrines “could be characterized as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in
violation of the principle of separation of powers”). But see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985) (arguing that “the continued existence of measured
authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the principle of separation
of powers” since “the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a
controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross” and “the courts are
functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is the legislature”).
86 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
87 See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28 (abstention appropriate where uncertain state statute
“intimately involved with sovereign prerogative”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–34
(1943) (abstention appropriate where federal court ruling would unduly interfere with complex
state regulatory scheme); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500–01 (abstention appropriate where resolution of
state law issue could render unnecessary the resolution of a federal constitutional issue).
88 See, e.g., Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975) (“We have
repeatedly warned, however, that because of the delays inherent in the abstention process and the
danger that valuable federal rights might be lost in the absence of expeditious adjudication in the
federal court, abstention must be invoked only in ‘special circumstances,’ and only upon careful
consideration of the facts of each case.” (citations omitted)); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (recognizing that abstention appropriate only in “narrowly limited
special circumstances justifying ‘the delay and expense to which application of the abstention
doctrine inevitably gives rise.’” (citations omitted) (quoting England v. La. State Bd. Med.
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964))).
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The outlook is somewhat rosier with respect to certification.
Because it is at least perceived by the Court to have lower attendant
costs to litigants as contrasted with abstention, 89 and because it less
obviously conflicts with any duty a federal court might have to hear any
and all cases properly before it, 90 the Supreme Court has been notably
more sanguine with respect to certification as a tool for fostering comity
between state and federal courts. 91 The Court expressed its friendliness
towards certification most clearly in Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 92 where it indicated not only that certification had come to
supplant abstention as the preferred method of providing a state court
the opportunity to address directly an unsettled question of state law, 93
but also that, because of certification’s practical advantages vis-à-vis
abstention, resort to certification is not limited to the same “unique
circumstances” as is—or, perhaps, was—resort to abstention. 94 As to the
latter observation, the Court went so far as to suggest that the mere
presence of a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state law” might be
enough to render certification appropriate in a given case. 95
2.

Remand/Primary Jurisdiction

At least with respect to abstention, federal court practice in the
administrative law context largely mirrors that in the state law context.
First, in the adjudicatory context, courts adhere to the remand rule by
89 E.g., Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79 (“[Certification] procedures do not entail
the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that generally attend abstention decisions.”); City
of Hous., Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470 (1987) (“The certification procedure is useful in reducing
the substantial burdens of cost and delay that abstention places on litigants.”).
90 See Clark, supra note 32, at 1550–51 (“[C]ertification would alleviate the separation-ofpowers concerns associated with abstention by preventing federal courts from ‘declin[ing] the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given’ by Congress. . . . Federal courts remain free to undertake
necessary fact identification both before and after certification, and to apply relevant principles of
state law to the facts once the highest state court has supplied the necessary rules of decision.”
(quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406)).
91 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (“State certification procedures are a very
desirable means by which a federal court may ascertain an undecided point of state law, especially
where . . . the question can be certified directly to the court of last resort within the State.”); see
also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976) (“Although we do not mean to intimate that
abstention would be improper in this case were certification not possible, the availability of
certification greatly simplifies the analysis.”).
92 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
93 E.g., id. at 75 (“Certification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device
called ‘Pullman abstention . . . .’”).
94 Id. at 79 (“Blending abstention with certification, the Ninth Circuit found ‘no unique
circumstances in this case militating in favor of certification.’ Novel, unsettled questions of state
law, however, not ‘unique circumstances,’ are necessary before federal courts may avail
themselves of state certification procedures.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995))).
95 Id.
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which a court will remand to an agency adjudicatory body in
circumstances where that body failed to address authoritatively a
potentially dispositive interpretive question in its initial ruling. 96 In the
words of the Court, “This remand rule exists, in part, because
‘ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices
that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.’” 97
Second, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a federal
court may, under certain circumstances, abstain from deciding a case
before it, requiring the litigants to seek administrative resolution either
of the entire dispute or of some particular issue. 98 As with the various
abstention doctrines in the state law context, primary jurisdiction is a
doctrine that federal courts are expected to invoke selectively. 99
Although “[n]o fixed formula exists” concerning when to apply the
doctrine, 100 courts are expected to take into account a variety of
considerations, including the importance of ensuring uniform
resolution of the regulatory issue in question, 101 the extent to which the
resolution of that issue would benefit from agency expertise, 102 and the

96 See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139,
171 (2012) (noting that the remand rule renders “[t]he analogy [drawn by the Court in Brand X]
between federal courts construing state law and federal statutes administered by agencies . . . more
apt”).
97 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (alteration in original)).
98 See Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1309 (observing parallel between abstention doctrines in
state law context and doctrine of primary jurisdiction in administrative law context); Watts, supra
note 13, at 1026 (same); cf. United States v. Mich. Nat’l Corp., 419 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1974) (observing
procedural similarities between primary jurisdiction and Pullman abstention). See generally
Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two Chips Off the Same Block?—A
Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75 (1974) (comparing abstention and primary
jurisdiction pre-Chevron).
99 See, e.g., Baykeeper v. NL Indus., Inc., 660 F.3d 686, 692 (3d Cir. 2011) (observing that
invocation of primary jurisdiction appropriate only in “exceptional cases”); Access Telecomms. v.
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We are always reluctant . . . to invoke
[primary jurisdiction] because added expense and undue delay may result.” (citation omitted)).
100 United States v. W. Pac. R.R Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
101 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303–04 (1976) (“[I]t may be appropriate to
refer specific issues to an agency for initial determination where that procedure would secure
‘uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency.’”
(quoting Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952))).
102 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs.’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) (observing that
invocation of primary jurisdiction appropriate when determination requires consideration of
“voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with
many intricate facts . . . is indispensable, and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in
a body of experts”).
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likelihood that judicial resolution would interfere with the agency’s
execution of its overall regulatory mandate. 103
Given the obvious fit between primary jurisdiction and the theory
of interpretive deference articulated first in Chevron and again in Brand
X, 104 it should come as no surprise that courts have deemed it
appropriate to invoke the doctrine when confronted with an unclear
term or provision within an agency-administered statute, hoping to
provide the administering agency with the opportunity to construe that
term or provision authoritatively. 105 Because the costs attendant to
abstention are, as in the state law context, substantial, courts have
rightly seen fit—even in the wake of Brand X 106—to continue to treat
primary jurisdiction as the exception rather than the rule. 107 Be that as it
may, adherence to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the way in
which federal courts have recognized most clearly their status as
interpretive subordinates when acting in the absence of authoritative
agency interpretations.
As discussed above, federal courts acting in the state law context
have increasingly come to rely upon certification rather than abstention
as the preferred method for providing state courts with the opportunity
to speak directly and authoritatively to unsettled questions of state
law. 108 For this reason, it is of at least some interest and significance
that—although federal courts have long adhered to a regulatory
equivalent to state law abstention doctrine in the form of primary
jurisdiction—the practice of certification has no obvious analogue in the
administrative law context. 109
103 United States v. Phila. Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963) (“[Primary jurisdiction] doctrine
requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme
dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme.” (citations omitted)).
104 See supra note 98.
105 See Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Mass. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“When the matter at issue is primarily one of statutory interpretation, referral of that matter to
the agency with primary jurisdiction may also be generally advisable in precisely those
circumstances in which a court would defer to the agency’s interpretation pursuant to [Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)].”); accord 2 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.3 (3d ed. 1994) (“One of
the many effects of Chevron is to increase the number of cases in which courts should refer issues
to agencies under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”).
106 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1029 (arguing that Brand X recommends “that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine should be revitalized”).
107 See supra note 99.
108 See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
109 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40 (recommending practice of inviting agency amicus
briefs in the administrative law context as analogue for state certification practice). Christopher
Walker suggests that federal courts’ adherence to the remand rule when an agency has yet to
exercise its Chevron deference, see supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text, is best conceived as
an analogue to certification (as opposed to abstention). See Walker, supra note 96, at 172. Even if
that is correct, however, it remains the case that the practice of certification has no analogue in the
administrative law context where an agency relies—as do most—on notice-and-comment
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At least in part, federal courts’ failure to adopt a regulatory
analogue to certification can plausibly be attributed to the fact that the
benefits of certification familiar from the state law context would, in a
large class of cases, fail to manifest in the administrative law context.
Remember, in the state law context, the principal advantage of
certification over abstention is one of efficiency: whereas abstention
requires a state court to conduct an entirely separate trial in order to
speak directly to the unsettled question of state law at issue, certification
allows such a court to do so having conducted only a much more
limited inquiry. 110 Contrast this with what a practice of certification
would look like in the administrative law context. As discussed in
greater detail below, following Mead, federal courts will, as a rule, treat
as authoritative only those agency interpretations issued pursuant to
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 111 As such,
certification in the administrative law context would either take the
form of a court-issued petition for rulemaking or a request for an
opinion from an agency adjudicator. 112 Setting aside for the moment the
option of requesting an opinion from an agency adjudicator, one can
observe that certification in the form of a court-issued petition for
rulemaking would provide no advantage in terms of efficiency over
abstention. Because abstention in this context would take the form of a
stay pending a petition for rulemaking issued by the plaintiff, the only
functional difference between certification and abstention would be the
name of the petitioning party. 113
In contrast with court-issued petitions for rulemaking, requests for
opinions from agency adjudicators would preserve the efficiency
advantage normally associated with certification. As in the state law
context, certifying a specific interpretive question to an agency
adjudicator would allow that adjudicator to speak directly to the
rulemaking as opposed to formal adjudication as a means of articulating interpretations
possessing the force of law.
110 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
111 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
112 While Professor Watts recommends the practice of inviting agency amicus briefs as the
appropriate analogue for certification, see Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40, that practice would in
fact amount to no analogue at all insofar as the agency interpretations contained in the resulting
briefs would, per Mead, be regarded by the receiving court as non-authoritative. See id. at 1040–
41 (“[U]nlike the binding views of a state’s highest court solicited using state certification
procedures in the federalism context—agency views solicited by a federal court in the context of a
particular case often will be set forth in an informal format, such as an amicus brief or an advisory
opinion, ineligible for Chevron’s rule of mandatory deference” (footnotes omitted)).
113 Which is not to say that the different name on the petition may not matter; it is at least
plausible that a petition from a federal court would receive greater public attention than one from
a private individual, and that an agency would, in part for that reason, be more inclined to
respond to a court’s petition. But see infra notes 215–23 and accompanying text (discussing
method for inducing agencies to respond to rulemaking petitions regardless of the identity of the
petitioner).

DOERFLER.36.2.2

2014]

12/18/2014 2:47 PM

M E A D A S (M O S T L Y ) M O O T

521

question at issue without the burden of having to conduct an entirely
separate adjudication, as would be necessary if the federal court were to
dismiss or stay the case pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. 114 As a result, that federal courts have thus far failed to act
in conjunction with either agencies or Congress to provide for this form
of certification cannot be excused on the grounds that doing so would
serve little or no purpose. 115 Given the rule on remand described above,
the absence of certification only becomes relevant in the somewhat
unusual scenario where a court is confronted with an interpretive
question pertaining to a statute administered by an agency that relies on
formal adjudication as its preferred method of interpretation, but in the
context of a case that did not originate in the adjudicatory context. 116
Given the relative scarcity of agencies preferring formal adjudication to
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a means of articulating
authoritative interpretations, 117 the practical significance of that failure
to provide for certification in the adjudicatory context is plausibly
minimal. Be that as it may, that courts would have only infrequent
opportunity to make use of this device does nothing to suggest that it
ought not to be added to the toolkit.
114 Invocation of primary jurisdiction thus differs from the remand rule, see supra notes 96–97
and accompanying text, which permits a federal court to remand a case to an agency adjudicator
with instruction to address a specific interpretive question. See Walker, supra note 96, at 172
(analogizing remand rule to state law certification practice).
115 At least insofar as the resulting advisory opinions were to have binding legal effect on the
respective promulgating agencies. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254
F.3d 173, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding advisory opinions that “have binding legal effect” on
promulgating agency eligible for Chevron deference), with Mid-Am. Care Found. v. NLRB, 148
F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts do not accord Chevron deference to non-binding
advisory opinions of an administrative agency.” (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,
177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
116 For example, in a National Labor Relations Act preemption challenge, “a party asserting
[preemption] must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language
and that has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by . . . the [National Labor Relations] Board.” Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 395 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Marine
Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 184 (1962)).
117 In the decades immediately following the APA’s passage in 1946, the majority of agencies
relied on adjudication as the preferred means of articulating binding agency policy. See M.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1398 (2004). By
the mid-1970s, however, agencies had come to substantially prefer notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See id.; accord J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L REV. 375, 375–76 (1974) (noting that agencies had entered the “age
of rulemaking”). And, while concerns with “ossification” and delay has led in recent decades to
increasing use by agencies of informal policymaking tools, see Magill, supra, at 1391 n.17, 1411
(noting increasing reliance by agencies on nonbinding guidance documents), those agencies
continue to rely overwhelmingly on notice-and-comment rulemaking when articulating policies
with “the force of law.” See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1484 (2005) (observing that “[w]hile some agencies
continue to use formal adjudication for the formulation of generally applicable standards, most
do not” (footnotes omitted)). Notable exceptions include the National Labor Relations Board and
the Federal Trade Commission. Magill, supra, at 1399.
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Prediction

While providing the relevant interpretive authority with an
opportunity to speak directly to an unsettled interpretive question is
perhaps the surest way for a subordinate federal court to avoid later
conflict, sometimes the costs attendant to providing that opportunity
outweigh the benefits secured by doing so. As a result, in many if not
most circumstances, the most sensible course of action for a subordinate
federal court presented with an unsettled interpretive question will be to
answer that question directly, albeit provisionally. 118 Be that as it may,
that a subordinate federal court will sometimes have to answer such
questions on its own does not go to suggest that that court should cease
to be concerned with avoiding conflict with later rulings by its
interpretive superior. In the state law context, subordinate federal courts
have demonstrated a concern for conflict avoidance by refraining from
exercising their independent judgment when answering the questions
before them, opting instead to resolve such questions by predicting how
the relevant state’s highest court would do so if it were given the
opportunity. 119 By conceiving of their task as one of prediction,
subordinate federal courts not only avoid aggrandizing themselves at
the expense of their interpretive superiors, 120 but also minimize the
likelihood that their determinations will conflict with later
determinations by those same superiors. 121 By contrast, in the
administrative law context, subordinate federal courts have
demonstrated much less of a concern with conflict avoidance, at least
overtly embracing the approach of exercising their independent
judgment concerning the “best” available answer to the particular
118 See Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1308 (observing that “in nearly every instance in which a
federal court is faced with an open state law question, it decides it. . . . provisional[ly]”).
119 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (2d ed.
1996) (observing that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction “must determine issues of
state law as it believes the highest court of the state would determine them”). For obvious reasons,
this practice has come to be known as making an “Erie guess.” E.g., Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354
F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that, in a “highly uncertain area of state law,” a federal
court is “forc[ed] . . . to make an educated ‘Erie guess’”); Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th
Cir. 1999) (observing that, when the content of state law is unclear, federal court must make an
“Erie guess” and determine as best as it can what the state’s highest court would decide).
120 See Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046–47 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Because a
federal court’s prediction of state law, until and unless overruled by the state supreme court, tends
to verge on the lawmaking function of the highest state court, it is critical that the federal court do
all within its power to view the problem before it as a state court would, and not through the eyes
of a court steeped in federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
121 Adherence to the predictive approach minimizes federal court “error,” Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997), and, hence, future conflict with state court
determinations by “insur[ing] that diversity cases will have the same outcome, as far as possible,
whether they are filed in a state court or a federal court sitting in the territory of that state.”
Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1267 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
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interpretive questions put before them. 122 Of even greater consequence,
subordinate federal courts acting in the administrative law context have,
following Mead, made a practice of disregarding direct, though nonauthoritative statements on the matter from the agencies with primary
interpretive authority concerning the interpretive questions before those
courts on the grounds that such statements are not “persuasive.” 123 As a
result, federal courts have, in the administrative law context, not only
increased antagonism between themselves and their interpretive
superiors, but also brought about increased unfairness to individual
litigants by increasing the likelihood of inconsistent rulings with respect
to like cases.
1.

State Law

Assuming that abstention or certification is impracticable, 124 a
federal court presented with an unsettled question of state law will, in
nearly all cases, arrive at an answer by attempting to predict what the
relevant state’s highest court would rule if presented with the question at
issue. 125 While the Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed this
practice of prediction (as contrasted with the practices of abstention 126
and certification 127), several of the Court’s opinions do suggest that

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (declining to defer to nonbinding
interpretation promulgated by Attorney General on grounds that Court “do[es] not find the
Attorney General’s opinion persuasive”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(refusing to defer to interpretation contained in agency opinion letter on grounds that Court
“find[s] unpersuasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue”).
124 Or that a request for certification has been declined. See Marin Tug & Barge, Inc. v.
Westport Petroleum, Inc., 271 F.3d 825, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The state supreme court
declined our request for certification. Accordingly, we must ‘predict as best we can what the
California Supreme Court would do in these circumstances.’” (quoting Pacheco v. United States,
220 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000))).
125 While the overwhelming majority of courts adhere to the predictive approach when an
authoritative interpretation of state law is unavailable, see supra note 119, a minority of courts
adhere to what Bradford Clark refers to as the “static approach.” Clark, supra note 32, at 1535.
Pursuant to that approach a federal court will refuse to recognize any cause of action or defense
that is not clearly established by state law. Id. at 1536–37. According to Professor Clark, federal
courts ought to prefer the static to the predictive approach on federalism grounds. See infra note
129. However, as Clark concedes, adherence to the static approach risks both forum-shopping
and inequitable administration of state law. See Clark, supra note 32, at 1542 (“If federal courts
employ the static approach, parties benefited by the status quo will inevitably seek to litigate their
cases in federal, rather than state, court because federal courts will rule against the proponent of a
novel claim or defense unless the party can establish that it has been adopted by an appropriate
organ of the state.”).
126 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
122
123
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prediction is the preferred approach when an authoritative
interpretation is unavailable. 128
Like abstention and certification, prediction by federal courts is a
practice rooted in a concern for federalism. 129 In Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 130 the Supreme Court famously held that, except in matters
128 See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“[I]n a case such as this where the state law is unsettled . . . . the courts’ task is to try to predict
how the highest court of that State would decide the question.”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311
U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (observing that state intermediate court pronouncement of state law “is not
to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise”).
129 Most federal courts understand the duty to predict how a state’s highest court would
answer a question of state law that it has yet to address as following straightaway from Erie’s
federalism-based command that federal courts defer to a state’s highest court’s state law
determinations. See, e.g., Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 625 F.3d
148, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A federal court under Erie is bound to follow state law as announced by
the highest state court. . . . [W]hen the state’s highest court has not addressed the precise question
presented, [we] must predict how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue.” (quoting
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“If the mandate of Erie is to be satisfied and the law ultimately employed is to be the law of the
state, the federal court, exercising its authority to hear diversity cases, must make a predictive
judgment as to how the supreme court of the state would decide the matter if it were presented
presently to that tribunal.” (footnote omitted)). Professor Clark argues that federalism concerns
actually militate against prediction insofar as the resolution of state law uncertainties, however
provisional, inevitably involves the exercise of just the sort of policymaking discretion that Erie
reserved to the states. Clark, supra note 32, at 1500 (“The exercise of substantial policymaking
discretion is the essence of lawmaking[, and that while] [t]he exercise of such discretion by state
courts ‘is not a matter of federal concern’ because the Constitution imposes few, if any,
restrictions on judicial lawmaking at the state level, [t]he exercise of substantial policymaking
discretion by federal courts . . . raises serious judicial federalism concerns” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))). For that reason, Clark recommends,
instead of the predictive of approach, that federal courts adhere to the “static approach,” refusing
to recognize any state law cause of action or defense not obviously recognized by either the state
courts or the state legislature. See id. at 1540–41 (arguing that the static approach “eliminates the
possibility that federal courts will usurp state lawmaking power by erroneously or prematurely
making the fundamental policy choices that are necessary to recognize (and apply) novel rules of
decision on behalf of a state,” and thereby “operates to reserve state lawmaking power to agents of
the state by preventing federal courts from circumventing the procedural and political safeguards
of federalism” (footnote omitted)). Insofar as one conceives of judicial federalism as establishing
within the domain of state law a relationship between state and federal courts of interpretive
superior and subordinate, see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text, however, the thought
that judicial federalism requires that federal courts refuse to consider how their state court
superiors would resolve a question not yet addressed authoritatively becomes somewhat difficult
to maintain. Cf. In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e should not idly
ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses dicta to
help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket.
‘Appellate courts that dismiss these expressions [in dicta] and strike off on their own increase the
disparity among tribunals (for other judges are likely to follow the Supreme Court’s marching
orders) and frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice by giving litigants an outcome
other than the one the Supreme Court would be likely to reach were the case heard there.’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.
1998))).
130 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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governed by positive federal law, federal courts are to apply “the law of
the state.” 131 Recognizing at the same time that the Constitution reserves
to the states exclusive authority as to the content of their laws, 132 the
Court went on to observe that, in the course of applying state law,
federal courts must take pains not to “declare” it. 133 In an effort to
comply with this dual command to apply but not to declare state law,
federal courts reject with near uniformity the impulse to rely
(explicitly 134) upon independent judgment when formulating answers to
unsettled questions within that domain. 135 Instead, in an effort to
minimize any disparity in outcome between federal and would-be state
court proceedings, the vast majority of federal courts limit themselves to
predicting how a given question would be resolved if it were to proceed
through the relevant state court system, including appellate review. 136 By
treating would-be state court rulings as the baseline against which to
measure their own, federal courts manifest recognition that “[s]tate
courts,” not federal courts, “are the final arbiters of their own state
law.” 137 Moreover, by adhering to the predictive approach, federal courts
minimize the likelihood of conflict with future authoritative state court
rulings, 138 thereby advancing basic fairness interests by ensuring as best
as possible consistency in outcomes across individual litigants. 139 Last
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78–79 (“[T]he constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the
autonomy and independence of the states,—independence in their legislative and independence
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the
states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or
delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an
invasion of the authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.”).
133 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
134 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222, 228 (3d
Cir. 1998) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Because this is a diversity action, however, we are not free to
exercise our independent judgment but must instead predict how the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would rule.”); Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[A
federal court’s] function [in a diversity case] is not to formulate a tenet which we, as free agents,
might think wise, but to ascertain, as best we can, the rule that the state’s highest tribunal would
likely follow.” (citation omitted)).
136 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 4507 (observing that federal courts must do their best
to “ensure that the outcome of the litigation be substantially the same as it would be if tried in a
state court and subjected to that system’s appellate process” in order to prevent forum-shopping).
137 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
138 Strictly speaking, a federal court’s ‘prediction’ is not a prediction but a counterfactual
assessment concerning what would have happened if the dispute at issue had been resolved by the
relevant state court system, including appellate review. However, the practical effect of making
such a prediction is to minimize conflict with later, actual authoritative state court rulings.
139 Given the paucity of available evidence, federal courts tend to be circumspect concerning
the accuracy of their state law predictions. See infra note 142. Limited as it may be, however, the
fact remains that issuing a prediction predicated upon all available evidence, see McKenna v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing the range of evidence federal
court ought to consider when formulating state law prediction), is often the best that a federal
court can do in terms of ensuring equitable administration of state law.
131
132
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and related, by minimizing the likelihood of conflict with counterfactual
authoritative state court rulings, federal courts that limit themselves to
prediction advance the anti-forum shopping rationale 140 underlying in
part the decision in Erie. 141
Because a federal court will often find itself with a relatively sparse
and inconclusive evidentiary base upon which to draw when engaging
in a predictive inquiry, the accuracy of such a court’s predictions can be
expected to be modest at best. 142 Moreover, and perhaps of greater
consequence, because the evidence available in a given case will often be
inconclusive, a federal court retains, under the predictive approach,
substantial discretion with respect to the conclusions it ultimately
arrives at, discretion that, as Professor Clark argues, that court might
use to implement its own policy preferences under the guise of
“‘prediction.’” 143 In this way, the predictive approach threatens, in the
worst-case scenario, to simply collapse into the independent judgment
approach. Be that as it may, that the predictive approach promises only
modest benefits in the best-case scenario and no benefits in the worst
does nothing to suggest that federal courts would be better off instead
relying upon independent judgment. Rather, all that the above concerns
suggest is that the predictive approach is an imperfect solution to the
problems that arise when a federal court, acting as an interpretive

140 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“In essence, the intent of t[he
Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried in a State court.”).
141 See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 162 (2003) (“[W]hen facing an
unsettled or unclear precedent on an important issue of state law, the federal court must review
the law available and predict how the highest court in the state would most likely rule, rather than
develop a federal common law rule which might differ from the state law rule and encourage
forum shopping.” (footnote omitted)).
142 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As a
federal court sitting in diversity, we are charged with predicting how another court—in this case,
the New Jersey Supreme Court—would rule on the record presented to us. Because of the dearth
of directly on-point New Jersey case law, this case represents yet another example of how difficult
the predictive exercise can be.” (citation omitted)); Labiche v. Legal Sec. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 350,
354 (5th Cir. 1994) (“We recognize that the task of predicting the final course to be taken by the
supreme court of a state is a difficult one. The Erie guesses made under circumstances such as
presented in this case are many times wrong. We have no assurance that the predictions we make
today will ultimately fare better than the notable similar forays into diversity jurisdiction that have
missed the mark.”).
143 Clark, supra note 32, at 1499 (“Because state law generally fails to provide meaningful
guidance regarding what weight, if any, to give such materials, a federal court’s ‘prediction’ of
state law frequently devolves into little more than a choice among competing policy
considerations.” (footnote omitted)).
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subordinate, is asked to address an interpretive question absent direct
guidance from its interpretive superior. 144
2.

Regulatory Law

A federal court attempting to construe an unclear term or
provision within a regulatory statute in the absence of any direct input
from the administering agency will, at least nominally, do so as it would
any other such term or provision, namely through the application of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 145 Whether in so doing such
a court could covertly predict how the agency would construe the
statute turns out to be a difficult question. 146 Regardless, when
construing such a term or provision in the presence of a direct though
legally nonbinding indication of the administering agency’s preferred
interpretation, federal courts have demonstrated a clear willingness to
disregard the agency’s preference. 147 In an effort to comply with Mead’s
instruction not to treat as authoritative agency interpretations contained
in instruments lacking “the force of law,” 148 federal courts have thus
failed to implement—at least in full—the predictive approach in the
administrative law context. This is because the full implementation of
144 Professor Clark argues that the predictive approach is at least not preferable to the “static
approach,” see supra note 125, for the reason that both approaches invite forum shopping and, in
turn, inequitable administration of state law. See Clark, supra note 32, at 1541–43. The static
approach invites forum shopping for reasons discussed above. See supra note 125. The predictive
approach, Clark contends, invites forum shopping because litigants will seek to take advantage of
federal court predictions that state courts have yet to have the opportunity to test. See Clark, supra
note 32, at 1542. Clark suggests that the threat of forum shopping, and, hence, inequitable
administration, is roughly equivalent under either approach. See id. at 1543 (“[T]here is no
apparent reason to conclude that one form of forum shopping is preferable to the other.”
(footnote omitted)). To this, two responses: first, in the scenario where federal courts have yet to
consider the unsettled question of state law at issue, the risk of forum shopping under the static
approach is much greater; this is because the static approach, unlike the predictive approach,
renders the outcome in one of the two forums certain. Second and more fundamental, so long as
variable federal court predictions yield, in the aggregate, a more accurate forecast of state law than
a blanket ‘prediction’ of stagnancy, the incentive to forum shopping will, ceteris paribus, be less
under the predictive approach than under the static approach.
145 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986
(2005) (observing that, in the absence of agency interpretation, interpreting court is left to discern
“the best reading of the statute”); Molly A. Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 946, 954 (2004) (observing that, outside Chevron’s domain, a “court will simply
engage in a de novo review of the statute through the use of traditional tools of statutory
interpretation”).
146 See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
147 E.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1275 (observing that, post-Mead, federal courts
of appeals have rejected nonbinding agency interpretations 39.6% of the time when applying
Skidmore framework).
148 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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the predictive approach in the administrative law context would result
in consistent deferral to such non-authoritative agency interpretations,
rendering Mead’s instruction mostly moot.
a. No Direct Guidance
Absent any direct input from the relevant agency, a federal court
will, at least nominally, construe an unclear term or provision contained
within a regulatory statute in the same way that it would any other such
term or provision, namely through the application of the traditional
tools of statutory construction. That a federal court defaults in this
context to the traditional tools of statutory construction is problematic
for two reasons. First, as suggested above, because this approach
involves a federal court exercising its independent judgment concerning
how the relevant term or provision is best construed, it in turn involves
that court aggrandizing itself at the expense of the agency that retains
primary interpretive authority. 149 Second, and perhaps more
consequentially, because the traditional tools of statutory construction
are tools for maximizing interpretive fidelity as opposed to policy
outcomes, 150 reliance on those tools by federal courts when construing
regulatory statutes in the first instances has at least the potential to
result in a systematic increase in the likelihood that the interpretations
offered by courts will eventually come into conflict with a later,
authoritative interpretation by the relevant agency.
As to the second concern, remember again that, at least from the
standpoint of an agency, statutory interpretation under Chevron is a
two-step process: At step one, the agency applies the traditional tools of
statutory construction to a given term or provision, determining the
range of interpretations that are reasonably available given the statute’s
text, structure, purpose, etc.; at step two, the agency evaluates that range
of reasonably available interpretations in light of its policy goals and
preferences, selecting the interpretation that accords with those goals
and preferences best. 151 So understood, statutory interpretation as
practiced within Chevron’s domain is markedly different from that task
as practiced without. In the run-of-the-mill case, while considerations of
policy may inform a court’s interpretation of a given statutory term of
provision, 152 a court ultimately regards itself as beholden to the
(legislatively embodied 153) intent of the enacting Congress. 154 When best
See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
152 See Scalia, supra note 49, at 515 (“[T]he ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ include
not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy
consequences.”).
153 As John Manning observes, both modern textualists and “Legal Process-style” purposivists
accept that the “intent” relevant to statutory interpretation is not the subjective intentions of
149
150
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policy and fidelity to congressional intent call for different results, it is
the latter that is thus supposed to prevail. 155 And, for that reason, it is
the latter that the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation are
calibrated to track. 156
Because the traditional tools of statutory interpretation are
designed to advance the value of fidelity over that of best policy, the
practice of federal courts construing unclear regulatory statutes just
through the application of those tools systematically increases the
likelihood that federal court interpretations will come into conflict with
later, authoritative agency interpretations. To see why, consider AT&T
Corporation v. City of Portland, 157 the decision articulating provisional
precedent that the Supreme Court eventually allowed to be supplanted
in Brand X. 158 In Portland, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine
whether broadband internet service is properly characterized as a
“telecommunications service” for purposes of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 159 In
making that determination, the Ninth Circuit stated plainly—at the
outset—that the task before it was one of faithful interpretation rather
than policymaking, remarking:
The parties, and numerous amici, forcefully urge us to consider what
our national policy should be concerning open access to the Internet.
However, that is not our task . . . . [W]e address the Internet aware
that courts are ill-suited to fix its flow; instead, we draw our bearings
from the legal landscape, and chart a course by the law’s words. To
actual legislators, but rather an “‘objectified’” or “constructive” intent derived from legislative text
taken in context. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 79, 90–91, 102–03 (2006).
154 See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (“Our [interpretive]
task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably
plain terms, ‘that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980))); United States v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is
easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.” (footnote
omitted)).
155 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside
in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.”).
156 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 209 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing “canons of statutory constructions” as “tools to be used to divine congressional
intent” (emphasis omitted)); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484
U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (“On a pure question of statutory construction, [a court’s] first job is to try to
determine congressional intent, using ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’”).
157 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
158 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–85 (2005)
(holding that Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Telecommunications Act in Portland does not
trump FCC’s later, conflicting interpretation).
159 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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that end, “we look first to the plain language of the statute,
construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and
policy.” 160

With its task so conceived, the Ninth Circuit went on to determine
that broadband service is properly classified as a “telecommunications
service” for purposes of the Act as amended, a determination that was
ultimately displaced by a later, conflicting determination by the FCC. 161
What is relevant here is not so much the fact of eventual displacement—
that can happen with any provisional determination—as the extent to
which the Ninth Circuit’s methodological approach lends itself to
determinations that will eventually be displaced. Whereas courts like the
Ninth Circuit seek to avoid “consider[ing] what our national policy
should be” in issuing its interpretation of an unclear regulatory statute,
it is precisely that consideration that will, under Chevron, guide the
relevant agency when it gets around to interpreting that very same
statute. 162 As a result, while it is understandable that a federal court
might wish to avoid engaging in “naked” acts of policymaking 163—
whether for reasons of institutional competence, 164 separation of
powers, 165 or both—that such a court bases its interpretation on
considerations other than policy makes it all the more likely that that
interpretation will come into conflict with the policy-based
interpretation put forward by the relevant agency at some later date.
To the Ninth Circuit’s credit, that court’s approach in Portland
may have conformed to the predictive approach much more closely in
practice than one might have thought on the basis of the court’s
characterization of its preferred methodology. The court began its
opinion by observing that the FCC had “declined, both in its regulatory
capacity and as amicus curiae, to address the issue before” the court, 166
suggesting that the court was at least open to taking into account any
policy positions the FCC might have articulated through a nonbinding
instrument such as a legal brief. Moreover, in reaching its ultimate
determination, the court reasoned “the definition of cable broadband as
a telecommunications service coheres with the overall structure of the
Communications Act as amended . . . and the FCC’s existing regulatory

160 Portland, 216 F.3d at 876 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d
1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)).
161 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
163 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
non-legislative body’s exercise of lawmaking power that is “not ancillary” to exercise of other
power but is instead “quite naked” violates separation of powers).
164 See supra note 58.
165 See supra note 65.
166 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
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regime.” 167 Left without any indication from the FCC of any policy
judgments not already embodied in current regulations, it is at least
possible that, by adopting the interpretation that it deemed to best
cohere with those regulations, the court was effectively judging that,
given the available evidence, it was most likely that the FCC would
classify broadband service as a “telecommunications service” if it were
to make that determination. 168
Whatever was the case in Portland, what to take away from the
above discussion is that, insofar as a federal court finds itself left to
answer an interpretive question absent any direct guidance from the
relevant agency, 169 the best available approach is plausibly for that court
to rely upon the policy judgments it perceives to be reflected in any
indirectly related actions taken by the relevant agency. 170 Such an
approach would allow a court to answer the interpretive question before
it in a way that, to the best of that court’s knowledge, reflects current
agency thinking. Moreover, such an approach would help that court to
avoid the dilemma it would otherwise face, namely a choice between
relying on its own policy judgment—again, unattractive based upon
institutional competence and separation of powers concerns—or
assigning excessive evidentiary weight to considerations that might
inadequately reflect the pragmatic nature of statutory “interpretation”
within Chevron’s domain. 171 While a court adhering to the predictive
approach in such circumstances would have no guarantee that its
arrived at interpretation will not come into conflict with a later,
authoritative agency interpretation (e.g., an agency might have made
policy judgments not yet reflected in any agency action, or that agency
Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
Viewed in this light, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, although ultimately displaced,
might have been as accurate as possible a forecast of the FCC’s future course of action, given the
limited available evidence. In this respect, that court’s position mirrored that of so many federal
courts left to forecast state court action on the basis of evidence ranging from scant to
nonexistent. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
169 This leaves open the possibility that a federal court has an obligation to solicit such direct
guidance through, for example, an invitation to file an amicus brief. See Watts, supra note 13, at
1034 (“Inviting an agency to file an amicus brief, therefore, could be particularly appropriate
where a court wants to expeditiously solicit the views of an agency that has not previously set
forth any views whatsoever, or where the court needs clarification about an informal
interpretation issued by the agency in the past.”).
170 In this respect, the ‘interpretive’ methodology appropriate looks somewhat like the
methodology proposed by Ronald Dworkin for resolving so-called “hard cases.” See RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84–86 (1977) (arguing that judges ought to resolve “hard
cases,” i.e., cases not resolvable by appeal to existing legal rules, by appeal to general normative
“principles” embodied in the laws); accord Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1721 (2005) (“Policies, principles,
and the like operate as background features which work behind the legal rules: pervading
doctrine, filling in gaps, helping us with hard cases, providing touchstones for legal argument, and
in a sense capturing the underlying spirit of whole areas of doctrine.”).
171 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167
168
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might simply revise its policy judgments at some point before it
addresses directly the interpretive question at issue), that court would
have done as well as possible, given the available information, 172 to
minimize the chance of that unattractive outcome.
b. Non-Authoritative Interpretations
Whether federal courts acting in the absence of direct agency
guidance in fact adhere to the predictive approach under the guise of
applying the traditional tools of statutory construction is an empirical
question that is not easily resolved. 173 Much easier to resolve, and of
much greater consequence, is that federal courts fail to adhere to the
predictive approach, at least in full, when acting in the presence of direct
agency guidance when such guidance is contained within an instrument
lacking “the force of law.” 174 Under current doctrine, an agency
interpretation articulated in a legally nonbinding instrument such as a
legal brief or non-legislative rule is to be regarded by a federal court as
ineligible for deference under Chevron. 175 In an effort to give effect to
this stated limitation on Chevron’s domain, a federal court asked to
construe an unclear term or provision within a regulatory statute will, as
discussed above, attempt to discern for itself the “best” interpretation of
the term or provision at issue, treating any agency interpretation that
lacks “the force of law” as merely persuasive authority. 176
In Mead, the Court announced most clearly the now settled
principle that only a relatively narrow subset of agency interpretations is

But see supra note 169.
In part, this is because of the difficulty of determining whether a court operating in such
circumstances regards the meaning of the statutory term or provision as sufficiently “silent or
ambiguous” to satisfy Chevron Step One. See Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step
One Holding?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532 (2006) (observing that courts seeking to implement
Brand X face the “challenging” task of discerning whether the earlier court regarded its
interpretation as “the only reasonable one”).
174 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). The appropriateness of prediction in
administrative law has received scant attention from courts and scholars alike. But see In re
StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (invoking doctrine of primary
jurisdiction as an alternative to predicting how FCC would resolve uncertainty). For instance, in
her article expanding upon the analogy between the state and administrative law context,
Professor Watts considers and rejects the predictive approach in a two-sentence footnote,
reasoning that adherence to that approach would require courts to consciously take into account
electoral outcomes. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1022 n.144 (“[A] court trying to ‘predict’ what the
EPA might do under a new Republican administration would have to take the President’s policy
goals and politics into account in arriving at a construction of an ambiguous statutory term.”).
That Watts takes this prospect to be an obvious objection is odd, given the at least plausible
acceptability of agencies relying on electoral outcomes as justification for changes in
interpretation. See supra note 54. Worse still, Watts fails to even consider the numerous costs
inherent to the alternative, i.e., relying on independent judgment.
175 See infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
172
173
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potentially eligible for deference under Chevron. 177 In that case, the
Court considered whether a tariff classification ruling by Customs
Service characterizing three-ring “day planners” as “[d]iaries . . . bound”
for purposes of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS), thereby rendering day planners subject to a four percent
tariff, might warrant deference under Chevron. 178 Holding that the
classification ruling was not a candidate for Chevron deference, the
Court reasoned that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous term or
provision is a candidate for deference only “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to [that] agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law,” and when that agency’s interpretation “was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 179 While the Court was
careful to note that procedural formality is not the only indicator of a
congressional intent to delegate, 180 Mead has largely come to stand for
the proposition that only interpretations arrived at through notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication are eligible for deference
under Chevron. 181 Its exact contours aside, however, what is clear from
the holding in Mead is that agencies are not to receive deference under
Chevron for an interpretation articulated in an instrument clearly
lacking the “force of law,” such as a legal brief or non-legislative rule. 182
Rather than instructing courts to disregard entirely interpretations
contained within nonbinding instruments, the majority in Mead went
on to hold that courts are to accord to non-authoritative agency
interpretations “respect proportional to [their] ‘power to persuade.’” 183
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–30.
Id. at 225–26.
179 Id. at 226–27.
180 See id. at 231 (“[T]he want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for [the Court]
ha[s] sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded . . . .” (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995))).
181 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1483 (2011) (characterizing Mead as treating “procedural formality as the
touchstone for Chevron deference”); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 359 (2003) (characterizing Mead as establishing procedural formality as
“the trigger for Chevron deference”). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 219–21 (2006) (describing a series of post-Mead court of appeals decisions according
Chevron deference to agency interpretations not arrived at pursuant to formal procedures).
182 As Cass Sunstein observes, “an agency may make rules that are binding, in the sense that
they have the force of law, without notice-and-comment when the rules involve agency procedure
or when there is ‘good cause’ for dispensing with notice-and-comment processes.” Sunstein, supra
note 181, at 223 (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012)).
183 Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). As the
Court went on to explain, a nonbinding interpretation “may surely claim the merit of its writer’s
thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of
weight.” Id.; see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“The weight [accorded to an administrative]
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
177
178
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As a result, when a federal court has at its disposal only some such nonauthoritative agency interpretation, that court is expected, it would
appear, to conduct an independent inquiry (e.g., through the application
of the traditional tools of statutory construction 184) concerning the
“best” possible interpretation of the unclear term or provision with
which it is presented, 185 taking into account said nonbinding
interpretation only insofar as it sheds light on what that “best” possible
interpretation might be. 186 Similar to the scenario discussed above, 187 the
extent to which such inquiries are truly independent is difficult to
discern. 188 At the same time, what is not at all difficult to discern is that,
with significant frequency, federal courts interpret ambiguous terms or
provisions in ways that are directly contrary to the non-authoritative
agency interpretations that those courts have at their disposal. 189
In another vociferous dissent, Justice Scalia took the majority in
Mead to task for displacing what he took to be Chevron’s general
presumption of a congressional intent to delegate with a system under
which courts would determine case-by-case and on the basis of a
standardless totality of the circumstances test whether Congress
intended to delegate interpretive authority to individual agencies
seeking deference. 190 As an alternative to this perceived dystopian
regime, Justice Scalia argued that the Court ought to have affirmed the
principle that he understood Chevron to stand for, namely that “all
184 For example, on remand, the Federal Circuit ruled that the three-ring day planners at issue
in Mead were “neither ‘diaries’ nor ‘bound,’” relying primarily on dictionary definitions of both
terms. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346–50 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
185 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 6, at 681 (“Under [Skidmore], the agency bears the burden of
persuading the court to exercise its independent judgment in the agency’s favor. In exercising
such judgment, however, the reviewing court must take account of the special resources that the
agency brings to the task.”); Watts, supra note 13, at 1007–08 (“[Within the Skidmore framework,]
the ultimate responsibility for selecting a preferred construction of the statutory ambiguity rests
with the court. Skidmore, therefore, does not displace the independent judgment model. Rather, it
merely serves as a tool that courts can use along with other traditional tools of statutory
interpretation.” (footnotes omitted)).
187 See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1255, 1281 (articulating alternative
conception of Skidmore, according to which deference accorded “along a continuum or sliding
scale, with the degree of deference varying according to the reviewing court’s evaluation of
Skidmore’s contextual factors,” arguing “that the courts of appeals overwhelmingly approach
Skidmore in the mode of a sliding scale” (footnote omitted)); Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has
No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 178 (2002)
(“[W]hen a court applies the Skidmore standard, actual deference is always a distinct possibility
even though Skidmore’s articulated standard suggests the reviewing court should exercise
independent judgment.”).
189 See supra note 147.
190 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has
largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be
held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): . . . ‘totality of the
circumstances’ test.”).
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authoritative agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with
administering deserve deference,” no matter, for example, the degree of
procedural formality involved in arriving at such an interpretation. 191 Of
particular significance, Justice Scalia observed that the interpretation at
issue in the case at hand, the Customs Service’s construal of
“diaries . . . bound,” constituted an authoritative agency interpretation,
i.e., an interpretation “that represents the official position of the
agency,” 192 insofar as that interpretation, originally signed only by the
Director of the Commercial Rulings Branch of Customs Headquarters’
Office of Regulations and Rulings, had been endorsed in a legal brief
filed by the Solicitor General and co-signed by the Treasury’s General
Counsel. 193 Asserting that an agency interpretation is to be regarded as
“authoritative” insofar as it “represent[s] the judgment of central agency
management, approved at the highest levels,” Justice Scalia remarked
that a decision by an agency’s general counsel to defend an
interpretation in court, let alone a decision by the Solicitor General in
conjunction with a general counsel to defend that interpretation before
the Supreme Court, surely indicates the interpretation in question
represents the agency’s authoritative view. 194
Setting aside the merits of Justice Scalia’s critique, what is striking
is the extent to which one arrives at a (near) functional equivalent to
Justice Scalia’s affirmative position insofar as one accepts that federal
courts must adhere to the predictive approach—taking into account all
available information 195—when making sense of an unclear regulatory
statute in the absence of a controlling agency interpretation. The reason
why is straightforward: insofar as one was attempting to predict whether
the Department of the Treasury, acting in its capacity as the primary
interpretive authority, would classify three-ring day planners as
“diaries . . . bound” for purposes of the HTSUS, what better evidence
could one imagine than a legal brief filed by the Solicitor General and
co-signed by Treasury’s General Counsel endorsing that
classification?196
Id.
Id. at 257.
193 Id. at 258.
194 Id. at 258 n.6.
195 In other words, information contained in binding and nonbinding interpretations alike.
196 David Barron and Justice (then-Professor) Elena Kagan cautioned that agency heads will
often feel compelled, for reasons having to do with morale, solidarity, etc., to affirm the
interpretations arrived at by their subordinates, particularly in the context of a final agency action.
See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
259 (2001) (observing that “[r]atification often will occur within agencies in near automatic
fashion”). For that reason, Kagan and Barron caution against regarding an agency’s litigating
position as the principal indicia of an agency’s “official” policy, at least insofar as that “official”
policy is supposed to reflect the considered judgment of the agency head. See id. at 258–60. What
Barron and Kagan fail to explain, however, is why one would not expect this tendency to affirm to
191
192
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To put the point more generally: under the predictive approach, a
federal court will attempt to resolve the interpretive questions before it
by asking, “how would the agency answer this question, if it were to do
so authoritatively?” As discussed above, in some situations, the agency
in question will have failed to speak directly to the interpretive question
at issue, leaving the court to predict that agency’s likely future behavior
on the basis of its indirectly related past actions. 197 At the same time,
particularly in light of the ease with which an agency can communicate
its views to a court through the use of legal briefs, a court will very often
find itself with ready access to remarks from the relevant agency that do
address the question at issue directly. 198 And, in the vast majority of
those cases, the only epistemically defensible answer a court could give
to the question, “What would the agency do?” will be, “What it says it
would.” 199 As a result, under the predictive approach, Mead’s instruction
not to accord deference under Chevron to agency interpretations
contained in instruments lacking “the force of law” would be rendered
mostly moot insofar as such interpretations would, barring unusual
circumstances, be treated as dispositive evidence for purposes of the
court’s predictive inquiry. 200
manifest in the context of a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding or formal adjudication.
In other words, even if one accepts that this tendency, assuming it to be real, is unfortunate from
the standpoint of wise policymaking, this leaves open the possibility that the influence of that
tendency on policymaking decisions is unavoidable. More modestly, even if one assumes, not
implausibly, that the tendency to affirm will be at least weaker in the context of a rulemaking
proceeding than in a litigation arising out of the final agency action in which the interpretation at
issue was articulated, there is very little reason to believe that courts will be well-positioned to
discern instances of affirmation that the agency head will “come to regret,” so to speak, from
those that she will not. And, in those cases where such an assessment would be defensible, i.e.,
where the assessment would be plausibly characterized as something other than the court
substituting its own judgment for the agency’s, the evidence establishing the assessment’s
defensibility would provide a specific basis for predicting a change of agency course. For that
reason, any sort of blanket skepticism towards an agency doing ‘what is says it would’ would be
both epistemically unwarranted and practically unnecessary.
197 See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
198 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40 (discussing ready availability of agency views as
contained in amicus briefs, particularly via court solicitation).
199 See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
771, 788 (2002) (“Where, however, the court does reach the merits of a statutory interpretation
rendered in an informal format, it presumably will have concluded that the action is a reliable
predictor of what the agency would do if it were rendering a binding decision.”).
200 In the state law context, probably the closest analogue to non-authoritative agency
pronouncements is dicta from a state’s highest court. Federal courts assign varying weight to such
dicta when predicting how a state’s highest court would rule. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Considered dicta by the state’s highest court may also
provide a federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal might rule on a particular
question. Because the highest state court enjoys some latitude of decision in ascertaining the law
applicable to a particular dispute even where there may be dicta in point, however, a federal court
should be circumspect in surrendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on
account of dicta. As Professor Charles Alan Wright has written, much depends on the character
of the dictum.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CHARLES ALAN
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c. Prediction and Incentive to Adhere to Formal Procedures
In terms of benefits, the advantages of adhering to the predictive
approach are even greater in the administrative than the state law
context. First, by framing the inquiry in terms of what it thinks that the
agency would do, as opposed to what it should do, the federal court
acting in the administrative law context, as in the state law context,
would avoid aggrandizing itself at the expense of its interpretive
superior. 201 Second, because the federal court would, in virtue of the
ready availability of nonbinding agency interpretations, 202 reliably find
itself in a strong epistemic position with respect to what the agency
would do, that court would be able to predict with substantial accuracy
future agency behavior, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood
that its interpretation will conflict with a later, authoritative
interpretation. 203 A federal court’s epistemic position concerning the
future behavior of the primary interpretive authority would, on average,
be markedly better in the administrative than the state law context. 204
For that reason, the decrease in likelihood of conflict resulting from
adherence to the predictive approach would, on the whole, be
substantially greater in the former context than in the latter. Third and
finally, because of the high visibility of nonbinding agency
interpretations, 205 a federal court adhering to the predictive approach
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 395 (7th ed. 2011) (“Mere obiter
may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement by the state court, though
technically dictum, must carry great weight, and may even, in the absence of any conflicting
indication of the law of the state, be regarded as conclusive.” (footnote omitted))). The willingness
of federal courts to dismiss some state court dicta as “mere obiter” plausibly reflects the
temptation to make state law under the guise of ‘prediction.’ See supra note 143 and
accompanying text. At the same time, one understands the hesitation to assign significant weight
to remarks “made in passing.” For that reason, federal courts plausibly do treat an agency’s
nonbinding views specifically endorsed in the context of immediate litigation as that agency’s
“official” views. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In so
doing, federal courts could identify those nonbinding interpretations that reflect current agency
thinking while simultaneously ensuring that current agency thinking takes into account any issues
raised by the immediate dispute. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034 (observing that solicitation of
agency views through requests for briefing would serve to clarify agency’s informal views in much
the same way as certification of state law questions serves to clarify content of state law).
201 A prescriptive, as opposed to predictive, approach would seem to run directly contrary to
the more general maxim that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983).
202 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
203 Subject, of course, to the caveat that an agency’s interpretations are expected to vary over
time as do that agency’s knowledge and circumstances. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
205 A major advantage of relying upon legal briefs as the principal source of an agency’s
“official” though nonbinding interpretations is that it would ensure the visibility of those
interpretations in the context of litigation. This would be particularly so assuming courts to be
under a duty to solicit an agency’s views in the form of briefing where relevant. See supra note
169. Under such a regime, an agency could ensure (so far as it wished) that its nonbinding
interpretation be taken into consideration by the court. Moreover, since such an interpretation
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would be much less able in the administrative than in the state context
to covertly implement its independent judgment concerning the best
available interpretation under the guise of predicting the interpretation
that would be preferred by the primary interpretive authority. 206
Because the agency’s preferred interpretation would be plain to view,
any deviation by the court from that interpretation would be apparent.
As a result, a court wishing to deviate from a nonbinding agency
interpretation would incur the substantial burden of having to explain
why the interpreting agency is unlikely to do what it says that it
would. 207
In terms of costs, the principal concern with implementing the
predictive approach in the administrative law context is that it might
allow an agency to effectively make law without having gone through
appropriate deliberation. In his dissenting opinion in Mead, Justice
Scalia objected that one “practical effect” of the majority’s decision
would be an “artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking,”
remarking facetiously that one ought to “[b]uy stock in the GPO.” 208
Setting aside the concern about artificiality, 209 Justice Scalia was surely
correct to observe that one of the practical effects—and indeed one of
the intended consequences—of the decision in Mead was to provide an
incentive for agencies to engage in “relatively formal administrative
procedure[s] tending to foster . . . fairness and deliberation.” 210 Under
the Mead majority’s approach, if an agency wants to be confident that it
will be able to rely upon its preferred interpretation when its actions are
subjected to judicial review, that agency will articulate that
interpretation in an instrument having “the force of law.” Because an
agency can only accomplish this through adherence to fairness and
deliberation inducing procedures, the majority’s approach thus creates
would be presented by the agency in the context of a brief directed at the specific dispute at issue,
there could be no question as to the perceived relevance of the interpretation or to the agency’s
desire to continue to endorse that interpretation in light of the facts of case at hand.
206 This would be particularly so where the agency’s interpretation was presented in the form
of a legal brief filed in the litigation at issue. To reject an interpretation in that context would be
tantamount to rejecting a state’s highest court’s answer to a certified question of state law, if the
answers to such questions were treated as formally nonbinding. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034
(analogizing solicitation of amicus brief from agency to state law certification).
207 To be clear, to say that the non-authoritative interpretation will control in “the vast
majority” of cases is not to say that it always will. If, for example, an agency wholly failed to
address a significant concern militating against its interpretation, that might be grounds for a
court to conclude that the agency would revise its interpretation having gone through the
procedural formalities of either notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. See
infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
208 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Once one conceives of the willingness of agencies to engage in formal procedures as, in
large part, a function of judicially-set incentives, see infra note 211, it becomes a bit difficult to
make sense of the notion of a “natural” amount of rulemaking.
210 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (majority opinion).
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substantial incentive to prefer formal, over informal, approaches to
decision-making. 211 By contrast, if, as Justice Scalia would have it, an
agency could be confident that it would receive full deference for an
interpretation articulated in a nonbinding instrument such as a legal
brief—instruments that can be produced without adherence to any sort
of fairness or deliberation inducing procedures—the concern is that that
agency would have little to no incentive to adhere to such procedures
when interpreting unclear terms or provisions within the statute(s) that
it administers. 212 Because prediction is a near functional equivalent of
Justice Scalia’s alternative vision of Chevron, the same concerns about
fairness and deliberation apply to it as well. After all, so long as an
agency can be confident that a court will accord de facto deference to an
interpretation articulated in a nonbinding instrument—in the name of
predicting that agency’s future behavior—one can reasonably ask what
incentive an agency would have to adhere to burdensome procedures
intended to induce fairness and deliberation when arriving at its
interpretations.
As to this concern, two responses. First, even if the availability of
de facto deference for nonbinding interpretations were to make it
possible for an agency to circumvent indefinitely the procedural
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication, it would nevertheless be the case that agencies would be
required to engage in substantial deliberation. Again, adhering to the
predictive approach, what a court presented with a nonbinding
interpretation must ask is whether an agency would continue to adhere
to that interpretation if it were to address the interpretive question at
211 As Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler explain, present practice results in a sort of
“pay me now or pay me later” dynamic, such that an agency can “pay” either the cost of
procedural formality ex ante or the cost of exacting judicial review ex post. Stephenson &
Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1464 (“This ‘pay me now or pay me later’ principle has gradually
emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct regulation of
agency choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of meaningful check—either ex
ante procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny—on administrative decisions.” (footnote
omitted)); accord Sunstein, supra note 181, at 225–26 (“Mead puts agencies to a salutary choice; it
essentially says, ‘Pay me now or pay me later.’ Under Mead, agencies may proceed expeditiously
and informally, in which case they can invoke Skidmore but not Chevron, or they may act more
formally, in which case Chevron applies. In either case, the legal system, considered as a whole,
will provide an ample check on agency discretion and the risk that it will be exercised arbitrarily—
in one case, through relatively formal procedures and in another, through a relatively careful
judicial check on agency interpretations of law.”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency
Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 534–35 (2006) (suggesting that Mead creates for
agencies a tradeoff between procedural formality and textual plausibility).
212 The obvious concern is that according deference to non-authoritative interpretations
would “undermine [Mead’s] doctrinal compromise by enabling agencies to issue [effectively]
binding legal norms while escaping both procedural constraints and meaningful judicial
scrutiny.” Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1464 (discussing Seminole Rock deference,
which threatens to undermine the “pay me now or pay me later” dynamic for similar reasons).
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issue through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication. 213 In making that prediction, one of the things that a court
must take into account is the fact that interpretations arrived at
pursuant to either of these sets of procedures may be rejected by a
reviewing court on the grounds that the accompanying reasoning fails
to address some significant concern speaking against that
interpretation. 214 As such, while it is true as a rule that a nonbinding
interpretation contained within an agency legal brief or similar
instrument will constitute the best available evidence concerning what
an agency would do if it were to adopt an interpretation that was
binding, one circumstance in which a court might make an exception to
that rule would be one in which the reasoning accompanying a given
nonbinding interpretation fails to address some such concern, insofar as
the agency would plausibly have to adjust its interpretation in order to
take that concern into account. Given that possibility, an agency would
thus retain an incentive to consider and address significant concerns
pertaining to its preferred interpretation even in a situation where de
facto deference was available in principle.
Second and more important, the carrot of interpretive deference is
not the only incentive available to courts in terms of inducing agencies
to engage in formal procedures. Though relegated to minimal use under
prevailing doctrine, courts also have at their disposal the stick of
rejecting as “arbitrary” and “capricious” 215 an agency’s denial of a
petition for rulemaking. Presently, “‘an agency’s refusal to institute
rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the range’ of levels of
deference” accorded to agency actions when reviewed for arbitrariness
and capriciousness. 216 While a sensible approach in general, 217 under a
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“A regulation will be deemed arbitrary and capricious, if the issuing agency failed to
address significant comments raised during the rulemaking.” (citation omitted)); Fox v. Clinton,
684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A court] will not uphold an agency adjudication where the
agency’s ‘judgment . . . was neither adequately explained in its decision nor supported by agency
precedent.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Siegel v. SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
215 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
216 Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Horse
Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); see also Lyng, 812 F.2d at 5 (“Such a refusal
is to be overturned only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances, which have primarily
involved plain errors of law, suggesting that the agency has been blind to the source of its
delegated power . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
217 As the D.C. Circuit explained:
213
214

[I]n a statutory scheme in which Congress has given an agency various tools with
which to protect the public interest, [an] agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing
which jurisdictional base and which regulatory tools will be most effective in advancing
the Congressional objective. As a corollary of this broad general discretion, [an agency]
has considerable latitude in responding to requests to institute proceedings or to
promulgate rules, even though it possesses the authority to do so should it see fit.
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regime of prediction, an equally sensible exception would be for courts
to accord substantially less deference—perhaps going so far as to adopt a
presumption against reasonability—to a denial of a petition for
rulemaking where an agency has previously sought and received de
facto interpretive deference for an interpretation adopted pursuant to
informal procedures. 218 By according less or no deference to denials of
petition in such circumstances, courts could prevent agencies from
being able to rely, over the long-term, on prediction as a means of
circumventing the procedural requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 219 While an agency could seek the benefit of de facto
deference for a nonbinding interpretation in the first instance, going
forward, an interested party would, by petitioning that agency to engage
in notice-and-comment rulemaking with respect to the interpretive
question at issue, 220 be able, with the backing of the reviewing court, to
compel that agency to “put its money where its mouth is,” so to speak. 221
Importantly, whether to be susceptible to such compulsion would
remain within the discretion of the agency. 222 Should an agency desire
not to be compelled to engage in rulemaking with respect to a particular
interpretative question, that agency would need only refrain from
placing its imprimatur on a nonbinding interpretation in the context of
litigation. 223
Administrative rule making does not ordinarily comprehend any rights in private
parties to compel an agency to institute such proceedings or promulgate rules.
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
218 This “one bite at the apple” approach bears some resemblance to Judge Friendly’s
suggestion, rejected by the Supreme Court, that agencies be permitted to set but not change
agency policy via adjudication. See Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495–97 (2d Cir.
1973), rev’d in relevant part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
219 One admitted cost of the above described “one bite at the apple” approach is that it would
make it possible for an incumbent administration to insulate to some extent its preferred
interpretation of a previously uninterpreted term or provision from revision by later
administrations. Cf. Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to
Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 87 (2011) (observing that,
under a regime in which courts are somewhat less deferential to inconsistent agency
interpretations, an incumbent administration will be able to “lock in” its preferred interpretation).
That cost is plausibly less, however, than the cost of permitting agencies to rely upon nonbinding
interpretations indefinitely.
220 Insofar as a party wished to do so at the stage of litigation, a stay pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction would be particularly appropriate.
221 See supra note 211.
222 Thus preserving the flexibility interests that motivate the generally deferential approach to
judicial review of rulemaking petition denials. See supra note 217.
223 As mentioned above, Professor Barron and Justice (then-Professor) Kagan express concern
that an agency head will be disposed to reflexively endorse in litigation a nonbinding
interpretation promulgated by her subordinate in, e.g., the context of a final agency action. See
supra note 196. Assuming the reality of this phenomenon, an agency’s discretion to “refrain from
placing its imprimatur on a nonbinding interpretation” will, in some cases, be somewhat
constrained. To be sure, such an inclination to affirm should have little effect in the context of
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To be clear, even with the above suggested increase in scrutiny of
denials of petitions for rulemaking, agencies would remain able to
receive interpretive deference without paying the procedural “cost” over
the short- to medium-term. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a
notoriously time-consuming (and costly) procedure. 224 As a result, an
agency would be able to rely for months or even years on a nonbinding
interpretation after its initial advancement in litigation as it waited for
the rulemaking process to play out. What an increase in scrutiny would
accomplish, however, is the prevention of agencies from being able to
circumvent deliberation and fairness inducing procedures indefinitely.
Moreover, it would accomplish this without requiring that courts
exercise their independent judgment concerning questions of policy,
questions the authority to answer Congress has delegated elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
According to the theory articulated first in Chevron and again in
Brand X, a federal court acts as an interpretive subordinate when it
construes unclear term or provision within an agency-administered
statute. As the Supreme Court recognized in Brand X, appropriate
recognition of that subordinate status requires that a court defer to an
authoritative agency interpretation of some such term or provision
regardless of any prior judicial interpretation. What the Court has thus
far failed to recognize, however, is that appropriate recognition of that
status requires also that, when acting in the absence of an authoritative
agency interpretation, a court limit itself to predicting how the relevant
agency would construe the term or provision at issue if it were to do so
authoritatively. Because interpretations articulated in legally nonbinding
instruments such as legal briefs constitute readily available evidence
dispute in which the agency is not a party. There, the agency would reserve the option of simply
declining the court’s invitation to submit an amicus brief, thereby remaining neutral as to any
previously promulgated nonbinding interpretation, i.e., neither confirming nor denying that any
previous interpretation was mistaken. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 196, at 259 (discussing
agency hesitation to admit error). However, in the context of a dispute in which an agency is, for
example, defending an enforcement action, the choice of whether to affirm a subordinate’s
interpretation, e.g., “a decline in the morale and loyalty of employees,” id., would be unavoidable.
Such are the difficult choices faced by an agency head.
224 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 283–84 (2010) (“[A]s anyone with experience in federal administrative
practice can attest—completing a single ‘informal’ rulemaking can often take many years and
consume a great deal of agency and private resources” (footnote omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1493, 1498 (2012) (“Every study of economically significant rulemakings has found strong
evidence of ossification—a decisionmaking process that takes many years to complete and that
requires an agency to commit a high proportion of its scarce resources to a single task.” (footnote
omitted)).
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concerning how an agency would interpret such a term or provision if it
were to do so authoritatively, adherence to this predictive approach
would result in agencies receiving deference for such nonbinding
interpretations in the vast majority of cases. While that result would
mostly render moot the Court’s instruction in Mead—that such
nonbinding interpretations are not to be treated as authoritative—it is a
result that seems compelled by the Court’s more general theory that
agencies, not federal courts, retain primary interpretive authority in the
domain of agency-administered statutes.

